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CHALLENGE AND RESPONSE -- U. S. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS

The public accounting profession in the United States

has come under heavy attack in recent times because of the
perceptions of its critics and the emerging recognition,
particularly in Congress, of the importance of financial

reporting and the role of auditors.

The criticisms of

the profession are leading to profound changes, especially

in the role and responsibilities of auditors.

Because the

ultimate objective of these changes is to provide improved
corporate accountability, they will have a significant
impact on corporate management as well.

Auditors have traditionally been looked to as a
principal means of providing a reasonable degree of

assurance as to the reliability of financial statements
to help protect investors and credit grantors from being
misled by misrepresentations or frauds.

More recently,

however, the function has taken on added dimensions

because government officials have come to realize two

things:
First, financial statements underlie the
financial data and statistics which are used

in the formation of national policies,
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particularly those relating to the economy
and capital formation.

And second, independent audits are a vital

ingredient in the scheme of control over

the conduct and accountability of the
corporate entity within our country.
To a large extent, the criticisms leveled at the
profession stem from a series of spectacular business

failures starting in the late 1960’s.

But they are also

a result of a general loss of confidence in the integrity

of business.

The energy crisis spawned widespread doubts

about the reliability of the financial and statistical
reports of the oil and gas industry.

Also, the hundreds

of revelations about illegal political contributions,

bribes, and off-book slush funds caused untold damage
to the credibility of corporate management.

It does not follow, of course, that these events

were necessarily accompanied by failures of auditors to
meet their responsibilities.' Nevertheless,

it is clear

that the result has been a serious erosion in the credibility
of the independent auditors.

This loss of confidence is

focused principally on perceptions that audit failures

occur for three reasons:

- 3 -

First, the accounting and auditing standards being
set in the private sector are deficient in quality,

quantity, and timeliness.

Therefore, it is sug

gested by some that the setting of these standards
should be transferred to a governmental agency.

Second, it is alleged that the auditors were negligent
and exercised poor judgment or were not sufficiently

independent of their clients and either knowingly

or unconsciously protected the interests of manage

ment at the expense of shareholders and other users
of financial statements.

Third, it is asserted that the profession’s technical,
independence, and due care standards are not being

enforced and CPAs and CPA firms are not being

adequately punished.

Therefore, the SEC is urged

by the critics to exercise its enforcement authority
more vigorously and additional forms of governmental

regulation of the profession are alleged to be
necessary.

These perceptions are so serious that the profession
can ill afford to ignore them even if they are greatly
exaggerated.

I believe it is safe to say that a great
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majority of the profession would vigorously assert that

such conclusions are not supported by the facts.

Because of the perceived deficiencies in the performance
of auditors and the accountability of corporate management,

there has been an avalanche of recommendations for reform.

These have been put forward by congressional committees
and their staffs, an independent Commission on Auditors'

Responsibilities, the SEC, and by CPAs themselves in their

testimony and written submissions to Congress.
Many of the changes which we have adopted, particularly
those in response to the Commission on Auditors’ Responsi

bilities, are aimed at improved corporate accountability.
Others are intended to bolster the independence of auditors
and to establish an effective system of regulation of CPA

firms.
Having described only very briefly some of the reasons

why the profession finds itself faced with heavy pressures
for reform, I would like to devote the balance of my remarks
to where matters currently stand.

Following the hearings of Senator Metcalf’s subcommittee
on Reports, Accounting and Management in June 1977, the
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AICPA developed a program of changes to respond to the

criticisms that had been raised.

As a result, a new

division was established by the AICPA to provide an
or
ganizational structure through which regulatory require

ments and sanctions can be imposed on CPA firms.

Prior

to this action, the AICPA and the profession had no vehicle

for dealing with firms as entities since the institute
membership is composed solely of individuals.

The new division for firms is made up of two sections,
one for SEC practice and another for private companies

practice.

CPA firms can join either or both sections

simply by meeting the requirements, which are designed

so as not be exclusive.

Firms need not have SEC clients

to join the SEC practice section.

Requirements imposed on firms joining the SEC practice
section include these:

• Mandatory continuing professional education
of forty hours a year for all partners and

each CPA and non-CPA member of the profes
sional staff.
• A mandatory peer review of the firm’s quality

controls at least every three years and at
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such other times as may be imposed as part

of a disciplinary action.

Such reviews

will take into account all matters which

may adversely affect the quality of audits.
• Imposition of sanctions on firms found to

be deficient in meeting the AICPA quality

control standards or other requirements.

The sanctions which the section may impose
can range in severity from required remedial

actions to expulsion and may include monetary
fines.
• Annual filing of relevant information about

the firm for inclusion in the files open to
public inspection.

• Maintenance of legal liability insurance
coverage as prescribed by the executive

committee of the section.

• Report to the either the audit committee or

the board of directors any disagreements
with management about accounting or auditing

matters which, if not resolved, would have
resulted in a qualified opinion.
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• A proscription on performing certain types

of management consulting services for SEC

clients, even though no instances have been
identified in which an auditor’s independence
was in fact impaired by rendering such services.
This matter is currently under study to deter

mine what additional proscriptions should be
imposed, particularly with respect to recruit
ing directors or others who would be involved

in engaging auditors.
• Report annually to the audit committee or

board of directors of SEC clients a description

of consulting services rendered and the amount
of fees charged for such services.

Also, the

percent of a member’s total domestic revenues
represented by management consulting, tax, and

accounting and auditing fees must be reported
annually to the section for inclusion in its
public files.
• Rotation of the partner in charge of an SEC

audit at least every five years and have a
’’fresh look’’ review performed each year by
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a partner other than the partner in charge

of an audit before issuing an audit report.
• Filing with the section annual reports

identifying clients from whom fees exceed

5 percent of the firm’s domestic fees.
Crucial to the success of the self-regulatory plan
of the SEC practice section is the appointment of a

Public Oversight Board to monitor the operations of the
section and, at its own discretion, report any information,
findings, views, or recommendations to the executive

committee of the section, the SEC, congressional committees,
or the public at large.

The board consists of five

individuals of stature from outside the profession with
established reputations for integrity and concern for

the public interest.
The board has access to all files, meetings, and

activities of the section and authority to employ its own

staff and set its own compensation to be paid from dues
charged to the firms.

Although joining the SEC practice section is voluntary,
it is believed that as a practical matter most if not all
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firms auditing SEC companies or wishing to do so will

join the section.

At the date of this report, all of

the seventeen largest firms (which audit over 7,150 SEC
registrants) as well as nearly five hundred other firms

have become members.
The section for private companies practice is largely

parallel with the SEC practice section except that the

requirements reflect the different needs of the type of
clients being served.

The principal objectives of this

section are to improve the performance of practitioners,
facilitate participation by smaller firms in the affairs

of the profession, and develop ways to tailor technical
standards to fit the circumstances of smaller and/or

privately-owned businesses.
In November 1977, Senator Metcalf’s subcommittee

on Reports, Accounting and Management issued a report
based upon the hearings that concluded in June 1977.

That report contained a long list of recommendations
that incorporated those of the Commission on Auditors'

Responsibilities as well as many others.

These recom

mendations are very important because they will be used
as a benchmark against which the profession’s actions
will be measured.
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Subsequent to the death of Senator Metcalf in

December, there was considerable uncertainty about

what would happen next.

However, early this year the

subcommittee was discontinued and its former responsi

bilities relating to the profession were reassigned to
the subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and the
District of Columbia chaired by Senator Eagleton.

At

the same time, John Chesson, author of the Metcalf
staff study, "The Accounting Establishment,’’ transferred
to join the staff of Senator Eagleton's subcommittee.

In April, Senator Eagleton sent a letter and

questionnaires to the AICPA, the FASB, the CASB, the
SEC, and the eight largest firms.

The questionnaires

were designed to determine the extent to which the
Metcalf subcommittee report recommendations were being

adopted and implemented.

All those contacted have

responded to the questionnaire.
It is expected that the subcommittee will hold

hearings early next year focusing principally on the
response to the Metcalf subcommittee report and on a

progress report which it received from the SEC on July 5th.

In an earlier meeting with Senator Eagleton, we were
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assured that he is not inclined to propose legislation

to deal with the profession so long as he is satisfied
that the AICPA and the SEC are making progress toward
implementing changes that he believes to be necessary.

So far, he has not commented on the report of the SEC.

In addition to these developments. Congressman
John Moss’ subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

held hearings in late January and early February followed

by a partial day of hearings on March 3rd.
Some of the principal positions taken during the

course of the hearings were:
1.

Senator Percy affirmed the Metcalf subcom

mittee’s decision not to support new
regulatory legislation at this time and

the subcommittee’s preference for having
the profession carry out its own reforms

in cooperation with the SEC.
2.

Although strongly supportive of the AICPA’s
program, Harvey Kapnick, Chairman of Arthur

Andersen & Co., stated that his firm was
prepared to join with others to establish

a self-regulatory body for SEC practice
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outside the AICPA if for some reason the

AICPA’s SEC practice section of firms was
suspended or terminated.

3.

Eli Mason, a practitioner from New York

and one of the petitioners in a lawsuit

against the AICPA, recommended legislation
that would require all CPAs practicing

before the SEC to be registered with the
SEC.
4.

Dr. John C. Burton, Professor at Columbia

University and former Chief Accountant of
the SEC, urged legislation to establish

a statutory self-regulatory body for
individuals and firms practicing before

the SEC similar in nature to the National
Association of Securities Dealers.

Key

recommendations included mandatory quality
reviews, sanctions, authority to set auditing
standards, requirements to qualify for

membership, setting negligence as a standard

of legal liability under the securities laws,
and establishing limitations on the amount

of auditors’

liability.
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5.

SEC Chairman Harold Williams, although

critical of several aspects of the AICPA’s
program for self-regulation, opposed

legislation and supported giving the
profession time to prove that its program

would be effective.

At the close of the hearings, Chairman Moss promised

that a report would be issued and that he would be proposing
legislation in the near future.

Although a report has not yet

been issued, a proposed bill was introduced on June 16th by
Congressman Moss.

The bill, as drafted,

is based in part on

suggestions made by Messrs. Burton and Mason in their testimony

before the subcommittee.

It proposes the establishment of a

National Organization of SEC Accountancy (NOSA), a regulatory

body for the profession under the direct authority and control

of the SEC, and provides for --

1.

Mandatory registration of all independent public
accounting firms

(and their licensed partners or

shareholders) which furnish audit reports to the
SEC and voluntary registration by all other firms.
2.

Establishing registration requirements in the body’s

bylaws, including the assessment of dues to fund
the organization.
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3.

Filings of financial statements and other pertinent

information by each registered firm or practitioner.

4.

Mandatory quality reviews of compliance with generally
accepted accounting and auditing standards to be con

ducted by the new regulatory body at least every
three years.
5.

Investigations of any identified problems or com
plaints regarding inadequate audit performance or
alleged violations of the federal antitrust laws.

6.

Sanctions including censure,

fines,

limitations of

operations or services, suspension, expulsion, or

any other appropriate sanction based on the results
of investigations.

7.

Suspension or expulsion for failure to produce any
document or cooperate with the new regulatory body
in conducting an investigation.

In addition, the bill provides for the following:
1.

Negation of the Hochfelder decision by

establishing negligence as the standard
for legal liability.

2.

Authority for members to conduct SEC

- 15 audits across state lines without regard

to state licensure.

3.

A requirement for foreign firms and prac

titioners furnishing audit reports to the
SEC to register and be subject to the same

regulation as registered domestic firms.
4.

The SEC --

a.

Shall identify accounting, auditing,
and quality control standards to be

established or modified by designated
bodies within specified time periods
and to set such standards itself if

the designated bodies act too slowly

or unsatisfactorily or if existing
standards have not achieved optimum

uniformity.

b.

Shall require a standard for divestiture

of all services which would prejudice

the audit independence of registered
firms or practitioners.

c.

May take disciplinary action on its own

initiative in the same manner as provided
in the bill for the new regulatory body.
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d.

Shall require all publicly-owned cor
porations to establish independent

audit committees with authority to
engage independent auditors.
On July 28, 1978 the Moss subcommittee again held
hearings to interrogate the AICPA’s SEC Practice Section
of Firms and its Public Oversight Board on the progress

made to date to implement a self-regulatory system.

At

the same hearing, Chairman Williams of the SEC was questioned

regarding the Commission’s report on the profession’s program.
In view of the opposition of the SEC at this time to the

legislation proposed by Congressman Moss, the hearing
ended without an indication of what further action might
be forthcoming.

Because Congress recessed in August for election
campaigning, there is not much chance that legislation
will be passed this year.

Nevertheless, a bill will set

the stage for subsequent action by Moss'

successor or by

Senator Eagleton, should he become persuaded that legis

lation is desirable.

Also, the SEC will almost certainly

find it advisable to comment on the merits of the bill

even though its position to date has been to oppose legis
lation until the AICPA’s program has had a chance to prove
itself.
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Under these circumstances, it is imperative that
the initiatives taken by the AICPA be successful if

federal regulatory legislation is to be avoided.

Standing

in the way at the end of July were a number of hurdles,
including a lawsuit filed by 18 members against the
Institute and a number of extremely difficult issues
raised by the SEC.

The principal issue in the lawsuit was whether a new
class of membership in the AICPA was created by the estab

lishment of a Division for CPA Firms.

If so, the action

would require a vote of the membership under the bylaws.
The petitioners were seeking to force such a vote and to
suspend further activities of the division pending the

outcome.

The AICPA’s response was that the Division for

CPA Firms did not create a new class of AICPA members and

that Council acted within its powers in creating the
division.

Briefs were submitted and oral arguments were heard
on April 27 before a judge of the NY Supreme Court.

On

August 2nd the judge issued his finding that the AICPA
had acted within the authority of its bylaws.

This

determination is appealable, so a resolution of the matter

might be further delayed if the petitioners decide to take
the case to a higher court.

- 18 -

In the meantime, the SEC submitted a progress report
to the Congress on July 5th.

It continued to oppose legis

lation at this time and is supportive of the Institute’s

program.

However, in the report,

the SEC continues to

press very hard for action on a number of fronts.

I would

like to list these briefly because they present issues that

are extremely difficult to resolve.

1.

Establishing the extent to which auditors should
be prohibited from rendering management advisory

services to SEC clients.

2.

Modifying peer review requirements of the SEC

practice section to provide, among other things,

for —

a.

Committees to monitor and participate in
firm-on-firm reviews and accept full
responsibility for the adequacy and results
of such reviews.

b.

Access to peer review working papers by

the SEC.

c.

Coverage of work done outside the United

States on international engagements.
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3.

Whether alleged audit failures which are the

subject of litigation must be investigated and
appropriate sanctions imposed without waiting
for the results of the litigation.

4.

Whether the AICPA should and can legally impose
a requirement that SEC clients have audit committees
as a condition to auditors’ expressing unqualified

opinions on their financial statements.

Such a

requirement might take the form of an auditing

standard or a modification of the independence
rule under the rules of conduct.

5.

Whether the Public Oversight Board should have

more line authority or should act as an appeal
body with respect to sanctions.

6.

Whether auditors should be required to report
publicly on the systems of internal control
of SEC clients.

We believe the SEC will continue to oppose new regulatory

legislation unless we encounter material failures in our
program.

In the meantime we are also implementing a number of
other key changes.
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1.

Meetings of senior committees and Council
have been opened to the public starting

last January.
2.

Three public members are being added to the
AICPA Board of Directors.

3.

The AICPA's rules of conduct have been modified

to permit advertising and solicitation.

4.

Representation of the eight largest firms on

senior technical committees has been reduced.
5.

A whole series of proposed changes relating

to auditor’s reports and financial reporting
are under study.
6.

The structure of the Auditing Standards Com

mittee is being revised to improve the efficiency
of the standard-setting process.

While we continue to be optimistic about remaining

self-regulated, it is clear that the outcome is far from
certain.

If we fail to take sufficient action to retain

the support of the SEC, the likelihood of new federal
regulatory legislation that would ultimately affect the

entire profession would be greatly increased.

If a
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regulatory body similar to that proposed by Congressman

Moss was

established in which membership of all firms

practicing before the SEC would be required by law, the
likely results would be --

1.

The profession would be split on a virtually
irrevocable basis by the existence of two

separate bodies.
2.

The present strengths of the AICPA would be

greatly diminished because the new federal
statutory body would more than likely be assigned

the functions provided in the legislation currently
being proposed by Congressman Moss.

These functions

are a substantial part of the basis for the Institute's

ability to effectively represent the public and the

profession.

Thus,

the center of attention and in

fluence would shift to the new body.

These are very trying times for the profession in the
United States.

But I am hopeful that through bold actions

and a willingness to make adjustments to meet the social
changes that are affecting us, we will emerge from this
period a stronger and better profession.

